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Kurzbeiträge / Reports 
 
Henning Melber 
 
China in Africa: A new partner or another imperialist 
power? 
 
 
 
he offensive pursued by China into Africa has provoked a vibrant de-
bate over the intentions and effects of what has been termed ‘a new 
scramble’ (which should not be mistaken for a simple copy of the old one; cf. 
Southall/Melber 2009). In this accelerated global competition for resources 
(in which not only China is a new competitor) Africa has emerged, in the 
view of many, as ‘a vital arena of strategic and geopolitical competition’ and 
‘the final frontier’ (Klare/Volman 2006: 297). This constellation has resulted 
in a growing number of analyses dealing with China in Africa (cf. Taylor 
2007 and Mohan 2008). As this debate illustrates, the trend continues. Inter-
estingly, the current controversies around the EU trade policy as manifested 
in the EPAs (cf. Kohnert 2008), the concerns over the US-American led fur-
ther military control over the continent (AFRICOM) as well as the experi-
ences with the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) feature much 
less prominently. While dealings with China initially have largely been guided 
by scepticism, if not open criticism, such one-dimensional perception tends 
to neglect other socio-economic imbalances and power structures.  
Recently, more and more differentiated, or even mildly positive contri-
butions, have been published, seeking to present a less negative assessment 
of the Chinese engagement. Maxi Schoeman’s contribution in this issue is but 
one of these attempts to do justice to the new power unfolding. She  
a) argues against a polarised view, which would force Africans to make an 
either-or choice between the old and new relations;  
b) considers China’s involvement as a likely opportunity for an African 
‘take off’ and  
c) suggests that the new ties might be a challenge and opportunity for all 
three regions (Africa, China, and Europe).1  
                                            
1  She is, of course, aware that these three categories are somewhat general abstractions 
which in the further course of fine-tuning would need to be replaced by more nuanced and 
differentiated analyses based on empirical realities on the ground. In the absence of hitherto 
T 
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In contrast, the complementary view presented in this article warns against 
too much optimism and ‘wishful thinking’. While it is indeed pre-mature to 
draw any final conclusions, evidence seems to suggest that a cautious view is 
justified.  
China’s (not so) new role 
Trade between China and Africa reproduces a classical skewed pattern: raw 
materials on the one side (Africa), in exchange for (value-added) manufac-
tured products on the other side (China). The global trade and exchange pat-
terns have, despite new actors, not displayed any meaningful qualitative 
structural changes. Chinese trade and investment in African countries is not 
significantly different from other patterns. They will not transform the struc-
ture of production nor make for a new international division of labour: ‘In-
deed, such trade can only perpetuate the dependence of developing coun-
tries on exports of primary commodities’ (Nayyar 2008: 17). In 2006 oil and 
gas accounted for 62 % of Africa’s exports to China. Non-petroleum minerals 
and metals ranked second (13 %) on the export list. In contrast, Africa im-
ports mainly manufactured products from China (45 %), as well as machinery 
and transport equipment (31 %) and weaponry: China is among the top sup-
pliers of arms to African customers.2 The trends suggest that China is in the 
meantime ‘a trade-driven industrial power integrated into the world system’, 
which ‘increasingly replicates in key ways longstanding developed-state po-
licies’ (Sautman/Hairong 2007: 77 and 78). 
While African governments often welcome the new partners in busi-
ness, there are growing local resentments towards China’s ‘constructive en-
gagement’ (Corkin/Burke 2008). It manifests itself in a wide-ranging pano-
rama of, at times gigantic, infrastructural projects from public buildings to 
roads, railways, harbours, and dams (cf. Brewer 2008). Chinese companies 
and their workforce (which is often imported too and kept apart in separate 
compounds) are perceived as unwanted competition and a threat. Chinese 
bidders compete successfully with local building industries and are accused 
of ignoring the labour laws and safety measures at the workplace. The same 
is said of Chinese mining companies, for example, in Zambia’s copperbelt. 
The Chinese presence also affects negatively the local survival strategies of 
                                                                                                  
sufficient case studies, however, and for the purpose of this debate, they seem to be an ac-
ceptable albeit provisional level of operationalisation. 
2  This was illustrated in spectacular fashion during May 2008 by what has been dubbed the 
‘ship of shame’, which sought to deliver military equipment to the ZANU-PF securocrats 
under siege in Zimbabwe and provoked boycott actions from the dock workers in the har-
bour towns of Maputo, Durban, Walvis Bay, and Luanda, who all refused to unload the 
freight. 
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people without salaried employment battling to make a living. This includes 
a hitherto unknown competition for hawkers and street vendors, who suffer 
from the effects of cheap imported goods sold in Chinese shops or even on 
the pavements at prices they cannot offer. Local retail shops are similarly 
worried, as is the local textile industry in several countries. 
A Chinese public relations exercise at the World Social Forum (WSF) in 
Nairobi at the end of January 2007 (in the Chinese-built sports arena on the 
outskirts of the capital) sought to underline the country’s long-standing soli-
darity with African partners, which plays an important role in the current 
imaginary (cf. Alden/Alves 2008). Instead, it provoked an outburst of anger 
by social movement activists from a variety of countries. They accused the 
Chinese of bailing out despotic and authoritarian regimes under pressure 
through their economic deals and claimed China was worse than the old co-
lonial and imperialist powers. While the latter used forms of exploitation 
based on cheap local labour, the Chinese were accused of generating extra 
profits even at the expense of the small traders and unskilled workers by vic-
timising them through the new competition, which has robbed them of their 
last source of monetary income (cf. Bello 2007 and my own observations as a 
participant). A volume by African scholars and activists launched at the same 
WSF testifies further to the, at best, mixed reactions to the newly emerging 
constellation (cf. Manji/Marks 2007).  
The Chinese government and its affiliated agencies seem to lack experi-
ence when it comes to such confrontations. They are not used to autonomous 
civil society actors openly challenging established state practices and pro-
moting alternative agendas. This is a marked difference to the competitors 
from Europe and North America. Their political systems allow an arena for 
voicing protest and provide space for social and political forces which also 
enter into anti-government alliances with partners in the southern hemi-
sphere. At the WSF, Northern NGOs organised protest campaigns together 
with Southern NGOs on a variety of issues such as the EPAs, climate change, 
or the effects of neo-liberal privatisation of public goods. This vital difference 
to a country like China, which keeps its political culture under tight control 
and allows no dissenting voices to campaign, contributes at times to a more 
nuanced and differentiated perception in the global South when it comes to 
actors from the North.  
This does not mean that the social movement activists criticising Bei-
jing’s policy and the Chinese expansion into African societies are less critical 
of Western imperialism (see also Guerrero/Manji 2008). For many among 
them and numerous other people on the ground, it is rather the choice be-
tween the pest and the cholera, as a critical Gabonese observer stated pro-
vocatively (Legault 2008: 42). But China remains the less known, un-personal 
factor since there is a lack of interaction with like-minded Chinese, who 
would through such alliances and concrete forms of support deconstruct the 
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‘unknown’ perceived as a threat. In Togo, reference among textile producers 
and traders is made to the ‘Chinese devils’, which according to Sylvanus 
(2008) epitomises the transformation of everyday lives under conditions of 
neo-liberalism. Similar frustrations are evident elsewhere. In many countries 
the anti-Chinese sentiments on the ground are tantamount to aggressive racism.  
The impact on continental policies 
Obviously, the current increase in the number of external players is strength-
ening not only the economic but also the political bargaining role of African 
governments. This is not negative for the people. But it serves them only if 
the elites support the public interest and are willing to create investment and 
exchange patterns which provide benefits for the majority. The chances for 
such a redefinition of the agenda are not great. A report based on six case 
studies observed  
‘that the government, particularly the executive, in many cases in Africa is 
comprised of a political elite whose reality is very much removed from the 
rest of the population. This results in policy-makers and influential opinion-
leaders crafting policy approaches that are not beneficial to the more im-
poverished sectors of the population’ (Centre for Chinese Studies 2007: viii). 
Potentially alternative choices – like new deals with China – do not necessarily 
improve governance. Chinese foreign policy is attractive for autocratic lead-
ers and oligarchies still in power over societies which are run like the private 
property of cliques. Guided by its gospel of non-intervention, China provides 
grants and loans to kleptocracies with dubious human rights records and is 
not petty-minded when it comes to the funding modalities (Henderson 2008: 
12-13). Not surprisingly, transparency and accountability are not among the 
core values cultivated in African-Chinese links, and Beijing’s notion of hu-
man rights is at best dubious (Taylor 2008) – although one should not forget 
that the West has also not been a role model in rigorously pursuing concerns 
over human rights violations, despite claiming to be committed to the noble 
cause (Breslin/Taylor 2008).  
For current ‘risk investments’ by Chinese enterprises, however, more is 
at stake than merely securing access to new markets and resources. Once it is 
a part of the game, ‘China seeks, as do all investors, a stable and secure in-
vestment environment’ (Mohan/Power 2008: 37). Chinese foreign policy seems 
indeed to be adapting. Leaving behind the earlier fundamentals,  
‘China has moved from outright obstructionism and a defensive insistence 
on solidarity with the developing world to an attempt at balancing its ma-
terial needs with its acknowledged responsibilities as a major power’ 
(Kleine-Ahlbrandt/Small 2008: 56).  
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Since the beginning of the century, Beijing, through its role in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations, has turned into an active contributor to conflict 
resolution efforts (cf. He 2007). 
Institutional quality and sound economic policies, however, remain the 
ultimate domestic ingredients for a development paradigm benefiting the 
majority of people. The unchanged nature of the current economic relations 
does not encourage such governance changes:  
‘In settings where initial political and economic institutions are relatively 
weak, dependence on primary commodities, especially natural resources 
such as oil, appears to have encouraged predatory government behaviour 
and rent-seeking, deterring the development of stable, democratic institu-
tions that are conducive to growth’ (Jerome/Wohlmuth 2007: 201). 
Governing the access to resources through appropriate rent and revenue 
management policies as well as by improving policy design and implementa-
tion are as important as a diversification of the economy and the creation of 
human and social capital (Wohlmuth 2007: 11 f.).  
In the light of the new scramble, the question is not so much a choice be-
tween Europe, the USA, and China (or any other actors interested in the Af-
rican resources). The challenge lies in setting a new course to make optimal 
use of the new scenario for the majority of the people on the continent. As 
Amosu (2007) concludes, in a variation of the African proverb which says 
when elephants are fighting the grass is suffering: ‘Don’t focus so much on 
the elephants. The future of Africa lies with the grass.’ This draws attention 
again to those who have always been at the receiving end of the unequal re-
lationships, namely the majority of people in the African societies. Their ag-
ency is crucial, and their interests should matter more than those of any oth-
ers. This also points in a direction which should seek to shift focus beyond a 
reduced Sino-African dichotomy termed as a reductionist ‘dragon in the 
bush’ perspective (Large 2008). As summarised by Habib, there remain great 
dangers in the current competitive constellation:  
‘It demonstrates that all of the countries in the scramble are driven largely 
by national interests, and that their behaviour is conditioned far more by 
competition with each other than by the noble sentiments enshrined in their 
policy documents and press releases’ Habib (2008: 274). 
This echoes similar concerns expressed in an earlier report for the Develop-
ment Committee of the European Parliament. It concludes that the major ex-
ternal actors operating in Africa  
‘are wary that their urgent domestic needs will be compromised if they dis-
tance themselves of their own opportunistic and self-centred policies. Short-
term gains still prevail over long-term stability’ (Holslag et. al. 2007: 50). 
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To neutralise this ‘destructive development’, the authors identify a need for 
‘a comprehensive and open dialogue between Africa and all its partners’ 
(ibid.; see also Holslag 2007). In that logic, there is indeed another task, namely, 
the crafting of an African response to China, as identified by le Pere (2008: 
34-36). The priorities he lists are  
1) a need to overcome the ‘yellow peril’ stereotype;  
2) African involvement in the harmonisation of bi- and multilateral donor 
activities on the continent;  
3) the need to urge China to participate in the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI);  
4) the need for African governments to improve their regulatory frame-
works and policies; and  
5) the establishment of a high-level continental coordinating body to guide 
and implement the Chinese-African cooperation agenda. 
Such steps would at least contribute towards an African China policy. When 
articulating such a demand, however, one should also be aware that there 
has so far not been any truly coherent African policy on other matters given 
the variety of political regimes and interests on the continent. 
Which development? 
China has also developed into a major donor that others react to (see Gold-
stein et al. 2006, Tjønneland et. al. 2006, and Davies 2007). China plays an in-
creasingly active role as a provider of mainly bilateral support (cf. Davies et al. 
2008). While Beijing is careful not to call it aid, this clearly corresponds to 
Western development assistance. Agreements are often based on loans for 
the implementation of a wide range of mainly infrastructural projects, which 
at the same time provide know-how, equipment, and labour for the financed 
work. There are concerns that China’s lending strategy might lead to another 
debt trap and new forms of dependency. These concerns have in one assess-
ment been considered as unjustified (Reisen/Ndoye 2008), while another 
saw a reason to demand established internationally recognised legal stan-
dards for responsible lending (Huse/Muyakwa 2008).  
Several ‘fundamentals’ of the current aid paradigm and policies are un-
der scrutiny when considering the Chinese engagement. These include the 
following: 
– the role played by multilateral versus bilateral relations among states; 
– the balance between collective responsibility and national sovereignty; 
– the prominence and preference given to either ‘hard’ (infrastructural) or 
‘soft’ (good governance and institutional capacity-building) priorities. 
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These areas touch upon earlier debates dating back to the days of the ‘devel-
opmental state’ policy of the 1970s. The official notion propagated then 
(largely by governments accountable mainly to themselves) demanded de-
velopment first, human rights and democracy later. Maxi Schoeman seems to 
be at least partly in favour of such an approach when she invokes the saying 
that one cannot eat democracy. This view contrasts with the understanding 
that there is no sustainable development without institutionalised democ-
ratic norms and the entrenchment of human rights and their corresponding 
values. After all, one cannot eat authoritarian rule either, and as the democ-
racy movement in African countries since the late 1980s has shown, people 
would at least like to have the right to say that they are hungry.  
It remains to be seen whether the proponents of the two views can find 
a way to shift towards convergence of the priorities in one coherent frame-
work that gives sufficient recognition and space for the implementation of 
both democracy and development for the benefit of a majority of the people. 
In a stock-taking exercise, Thorborg concludes,  
‘if China is prepared to encourage more multi-laterality and if African 
states through the AU can work out common strategies a more equal and 
win-win relationship could ensue’ (Thorborg 2008: 14).  
Many also share the hope that the different major global players can find suf-
ficient common ground to act within the defined framework ‘of a multi-polar 
world emerging in a multilateral form, rather than in the shape of two or 
more hostile camps’ (Grant/Barysch 2008: 104). This corresponds with expec-
tations articulated not only by Maxi Schoeman but also in other preliminary 
assessments. Ampiah and Naidu (2008: 338) support a related forward-
looking approach, stressing the need for recognition of an ‘enlightened self-
ishness’ as the guiding principle for an evolving partnership to bring about 
the maximum good for Africa’s people. There seems to be evidence that the 
new players on the continent might indeed provide additional windows of 
opportunity (McCormick 2008). In the absence of some comforting concrete 
evidence this view might be a knee-jerk response to earlier more negative 
perceptions – a kind of positive ‘wishful thinking’. What most authors agree 
upon at this stage is the urgent need for more elaborate and empirically 
sound studies which investigate the realities within countries much more 
rigorously before drawing general conclusions.  
China signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness adopted on 2 March 
2005. This committed it to the principles of ownership of recipients, align-
ment of aid to national priorities, and harmonisation and coherence among 
donor countries. It is not clear, however, whether China signed up in its capac-
ity as a recipient rather than as a donor country (Davies 2007: 13). The Accra 
Agenda for Action, endorsed on 4 September 2008 by ministers of developing 
and donor countries and heads of multi- and bi-lateral development institu-
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tions attending the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness stressed that ‘all 
development actors will work in more inclusive partnerships’. This signals the 
intent to find a common denominator – but in whose interest?  
Considered as a successful developing country in the era of current glo-
balisation, China has called its own programme of socio-economic transfor-
mation and reform Gai Ge Kai Feng, meaning ‘change the system, open the 
door’. This includes the privatisation of large parts of the ownership in the 
economy, the liberalisation of trade and investment, and the development of 
high-quality infrastructure guided by market principles (cf. Dollar 2008). 
This, after all, sounds not too different from the Western development dis-
course. It is nevertheless questionable as to whether this is good news for Af-
rica. For Guttal (2008: 34) ‘China’s current aid and foreign investment prac-
tices have begun to dangerously resemble colonialism’. There are similar 
concerned and critical voices that are more reluctant than others to argue for 
a welcoming embrace to a new global player, which after all might not 
change the rules of the game but simply join the hegemonic club and dance 
to its tune. Their fear is that China in the end might merely offer more of the 
same instead of being a true alternative.  
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